




















Abstract:Interpreter of statute who uses imaginary reconstruction tries to discover the intention of law－maker with re-
spect to the particular point in controversy，if they are present． Imaginary reconstruction，which stems from the idea of‘eq-
uity in statute’，argues that judges should imagine what legislator would say in the face of ambiguity or obscene of statutory
language． The intention of legislator reconstructed can be divided into three type－application intention，semantic intention，
and purposive intention－which means judges using this method should consider all relavent information so as to get a coher-
ent result ． As a substantive－ evaluating gap filling methods，however，interpreters should pay attention to questions about
the generality level and proxy of legislative intention，the reconstruction of historical condition and value judgement． Only by
perceptual knowledge and rational knowledge，can judges receive appropriate answer from imaginary reconstruction．


















































































































2 Plow． 459，75 Eng． Ｒep． 688 (1574) ，cited from M． B． W．
Sinclair，Legislative Intent:Fact or Fabrication?，New York Law School




















































































问题》，张国清译，江苏人民出版社 2008 年版，第 53 页以下，以及
Solum，Lawrence B．，Semantic Originalism，Illinois Public Law Ｒesearch
Paper No． 07 － 24．，available at SSＲN:https:/ / ssrn． com /abstract =
1120244 or http:/ /dx．doi． org /10．2139 /ssrn．1120244。其实，“意图”和
“目的”的区分并没有那么大，一些学者甚至认为意图应该包括“意向
意义(intend meaning)”和“意向目的(intention)”。参见 James M． Lan-




























































































① 关于这个观点，请参见 Walter Benn Michaels，Intentionalism，
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① M Gleeson，The Meaning of Legislation:Context，Purpose and
Ｒespect for Fundamental Ｒights＇ Address to Victoria Law Foundation，Mel-
bourne，31 July 2008，13，cited from Michelle Sanson，Statutory Interpre-




















































































































































































See John Austin，Lectures on Jurisprudence，pp． 596－97(Ｒob-
ert Campbell ed．，4th ed． 1873) ，cited from John F． Manning，Textualism
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